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NOTES

INDIANS, NON-INDIANS, AND THE ENDANGERED
PANTHER; WILL THE INDIAN/NON-INDIAN CONFLICT
BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE PANTHER DISAPPEARS?
Tina L. Morln*
INTRODUCTION

The majestic Florida panther, Jelis concolor coryt, is a predatory
mammal of the subtropics.' A male panther roams over a two hundred to
three hundred square mile area, while a female panther's range is fifty to
one hundred square miles.2 The panther's historic range stretched from
Louisiana and Arizona east to South Carolina and Florida.
The Florida panther has been listed as endangered since 1967 3It was
one of the first species protected under the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, the predecessor of the present Endangered Species Act.4
It is now protected under the Endangered Species Act and Florida Statute
Section 372.671.1
The panther does not read treaties nor does it recognize reservation
boundary lines or differentiate between Indians and non-Indians. Its only
focus is survival. Despite this focus, the panther, like many endangered
species, is losing its battle for survival.
Today, only twenty to fifty panthers remain in the wild in southern
Florida, frequently inhabiting the Big Cypress Indian Reservation.' As
this majestic creature is disappearing, its main predator, the human
* 1992 University of Montana School of Law graduate. The author wishes to thank Professor
Margery Brown of the University of Montana Law School for her assistance and Tracey and Tammie
Morn for their support.
1. Robert Laurence, The Bald Eagle, the FloridaPantherand the Nation s Word: An Essay on
the "Quiet" Abrogation of Indian Treaties and the ProperReading of United States v. Dion, 4 J.
Land Use & Envtl. L. 1 (1988).
2. Id. at 17.
3. United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. 1485, 1496 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
4. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1991).
5. Endangered Species Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-669,80 Stat. 926 (1966). Endangered
Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205,87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543

(1990)).
6. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 372.671 (West 1988).
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population, continues to be divided into territorial jurisdictions-state,
federal, and tribal. These divisions produce inevitable legal conflicts.
While the court battles rage, the panthers continue to die.
Ironically, both Indians and non-Indians would probably list the
preservation of the Florida panther as one of their goals. Instead of
cooperating to protect the Florida panther, Indians and non-Indians
continue to focus on determining their respective rights. The biggest loser
in this human struggle is the panther, as well as other endangered species;
they cannot speak for themselves.
This casenote addresses the significance of the recent Florida District
Court of Appeals case, State v Billie,7 and the subsequent Federal District
Court case involving the same defendant, United States v Billie.8
These cases go far beyond the precedent setting case of U.S. v Dion9
with respect to Indian treaty rights. This casenote reviews the case law
leading up to the Billie cases and predicts how the Billie cases will
potentially affect future case law Finally, this casenote evaluates whether
the direction taken by the courts in the Billie decisions is necessary to
protect and preserve the panther and other endangered species.
FACTS

President Taft created the Big Cypress Indian Reservation for the
Seminole Indians in southern Florida by executive order in 1911 10 Prior to
the creation of the Big Cypress Indian Reservation, the United States had
repeatedly attempted to end the Seminole Indian Wars. 1 Pursuant to the
federal removal policy, and in an effort to resolve land disputes with other
tribes, the United States tried to convince the Seminoles to settle west of
the Mississippi. 2 The United States failed in its efforts to remove the
Seminoles from Florida. Consequently much later, President Taft created
the Big Cypress Indian Reservation by executive order 13
Reservations created by executive order have the same implicit
hunting rights as reservations created by treaty 1 Executive Order No.
1379 did not explicitly reserve hunting and fishing rights to the Seminole
Indians. However, by setting aside land for the reservation, hunting and

7. 497 So. 2d 889 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1986).
8. 667 F Supp. 1485 (S.E. Fla. 1987).
9. 106 S. Ct. 2216 (1986).
10. State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 891.
11. See, e.g., Treaty with the Seminole (May 9, 1832), 7 Stat. 368; Treaty with the Seminole
(March 28, 1833), 7 Stat. 423; Treaty with the Creeks and Seminole (January 4, 1845), 9 Stat. 821;
Treaty with the Creeks (August 7, 1856), 11 Stat. 699.
12. United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1488.
13. Executive Order No. 1379 (June 28, 1911).
14. State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 891.
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fishing rights were impliedly reserved.1 5 "As a general rule, Indians enjoy
exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to them, unless
such rights were clearly relinquished by treaty or have been modified by
Congress."" Therefore, the Big Cypress Indian Reservation carries with it
7
traditional hunting rights.1
On December 1, 1983, James E. Billie, Chairperson of the Seminole
tribe, killed a Florida panther. 8 The use of the Florida panther in Seminole
religious and cultural practice varies."9 Seminole medicine men use various
animal parts, with chants and prayers, to help others.20 According to
Seminole beliefs the Creator chose the panther as the first animal to enter
earth. 2 ' God, or the breathmaker, gives the animal parts their powers.
Numerous medicine men from the Seminole tribe testified at Billie's trial
that panther claws and tails are important parts of a medicine man's
bundle and relieve muscle cramps.2 2 Billie testified, however, that he had
not thought about what he would do with the panther he shot until the
morning it was seized.23 After the panther was seized, Billie decided he
might give it to an experienced medicine man because he himself was just a
novice. 4 Because Billie did not present evidence that he killed the panther
specifically for religious reasons, neither the Florida district court nor the
federal district court determined whether the First Amendment protected
Billie's killing of the panther. 5 Florida charged Billie with violating
Florida Statute 372.671 which protects the Florida panther.26
The Florida Circuit Court, Hendry County, dismissed the information filed by the state against Billie. The Florida Circuit Court, adopting a
principle enunciated by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v White2" and UnitedStates v Dion,2 9 held that Congress needed to
expressly abrogate treaty rights in order for states to regulate onreservation treaty rights through federal conservation laws.30 The Florida
Circuit Court concluded that the state of Florida could not regulate

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1488.
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 891.
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 890.
United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1497.

20. Id. at 1496.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1497.
Id.
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 895; United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1497.
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 890.

27. Id.
28. 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).
29.

476 U.S. at 740.

30. State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 890.
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endangered species on Indian reservations under the Endangered Species
Act."' The Court determined that the state could not have greater
authority over Indians on reservation lands than the authority given to the
state by Congress.3 2 The state appealed that decision. 3
HOLDING

The District Court of Appeals of Florida vacated the order of the
Florida Circuit Court. 34 The District Court of Appeals reinstated the
information filed by the state against Billie, charging Billie with the killing
of a Florida panther in violation of Florida Statute 372.671 " The Florida
District Court of Appeals held that Florida had jurisdiction to protect the
panthers pursuant to state law which was more protective than the federal
Endangered Species Act.36 The Florida District Court of Appeals held that
Billie's right to hunt on the reservation could be regulated by the state in
order to conserve a species. Additionally, the Florida District Court of
Appeals found that treaty rights did not insulate the defendant from the
application of Florida criminal law under Public Law 280.17 Therefore,
Florida had the authority to charge Billie with the unlawful killing of the
panther 38 The Supreme Court of Florida denied review of the case on
March 24, 1987 19
Subsequently, prosecution by the state of Florida commenced in
federal district court against Billie for violation of the Endangered Species
Act.40 The federal district court held that the Endangered Species Act
applied to hunting of Florida panthers on the Seminole Indian reservation.4 1 The federal court also held that the Act did not unconstitutionally
infringe on Billie's right to free exercise of religion where the use of the
panther was not indispensable to Billie's religious practices.4 2
DISCUSSION OF PRIOR LAW

Since the Supreme Court ruled in 1903 that the federal government
had the power to legally abrogate the Indian treaty rights,4 3 many cases
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 895.
Id.
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 894.
Id. at 895. See infra, text accompanying note 87 through 91.
Id.
Billie v. State, 506 So. 2d 1040 (1987).
United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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have come before the Court to decide whether Congress intended to
abrogate treaty rights when Congress enacted laws affecting tribes." The
courts have used several tests to determine whether Congress intended to
abrogate Indian treaty rights. 45 The most common tests are:
1. Abrogation
only upon a "clear showing" of legislative
46
intent;
47
2. Abrogation "not lightly implied";
3. Abrogation only after "liberal construction" of the statute in
favor of Indian treaty rights;48 and
4. Abrogation only upon "express legislative reference" to
Indian treaty rights.49
The first test, abrogation only upon a "clear showing" of legislative
intent, was used in United States v Santa Fe Pacific R.R.. 5° There, the
Supreme Court held that congressional establishment of a reservation for
the Walapai Indians did not operate to extinguish Indian title to offreservation land that the railroad wanted. 51 Creating the reservation was
not a clear expression of congressional intent to extinguish Indian title to
the off-reservation land.5 2
The "not lightly implied" test is a much weaker test. 53 This test
permits an abrogation of treaty rights upon a "reasonable" showing of
legislative intent to abrogate. 54 The test does not specify how strong the
showing should be. 55 In Menominee Tribe v United States,56 the court
could find no specific reference to Indian hunting and fishing rights in the
Menominee Termination Act of 1954.57 The Termination Act ostensibly
made all state statutes applicable on the reservation thereby abrogating the
Indian hunting and fishing rights. 5 The court applied the "not lightly
implied test" and held that the Termination Act did not abrogate the

44. Charles Wilkinson & John M. Volkmran,JudicialRevewofIndianTreatyAbrogatiorn "As
Long as Water Flows, or GrassGrows Upon the Earth"--HowLong a Time Is That?, 63 Cal. L. Rev.
601, 623 (1975).
45. Id.
46. United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
47. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
48. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
49. Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Galveston R.R. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733 (1876).
50. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 44, at 623.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 44, at 625.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 391 U.S. at 405.
57. Menominee Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1988).
58. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 44, at 636.
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hunting and fishing rights.5 9
The third test, abrogation of treaty rights only after "liberal construction" of the statute in favor of the Indian treaty rights, was used in Choate
v Trapp 60 Here the court relied on three primary rules of treaty
construction: 6' 1 treaties should be liberally construed in favor of the
Indians; treaties should be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them at the time of their drafting, not how the government would
have understood them; and any ambiguous expressions in the treaties
should be resolved in favor of the tribes involved.6" These rules of treaty
construction were developed because of the unequal bargaining power
between the tribes and the federal government at the time the treaties were
signed."3 The courts use these rules of construction to protect the
reasonable expectations of the tribes.6 4
In Choate, the Supreme Court was faced with determining whether
the State could tax land allotted to the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes. The
Court, relying on the rules of treaty construction, resolved the doubt in
favor of the tribes. In Menominee Tribe v United States,6 5 the Supreme
Court similarly relied on the rules of treaty construction to hold that
hunting and fishing rights were reserved by the treaty phrase "to be held as
Indian lands are to be held." 6
The fourth test, abrogation only upon express legislative reference,
has been the predominant test.6 7 Indeed, in 1975, Charles Wilkinson, a
leading Indian law scholar, stated that the United States Supreme Court
had not found abrogation of Indian treaty rights in the preceding century
without an "express legislative reference" to Indian treaty rights.6 8 A
leading case for this test is United States v White69 decided in 1974. In
White, the Eighth Circuit held that a member of the Red Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians could not be prosecuted for violation of 16 U.S.C.
Section 668(a) (the Bald Eagle Protection Act) prohibiting the taking of
eagles7 ° because the legislation made no specific reference to Indian treaty
rights. 7 '

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
224 U.S. 665 (1912).
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 44, at 626.
Id.
Id.
Id.
391 U.S. at 405.
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 44, at 618.
Id. at 630.
Id.
508 F.2d 453, 454 (8th Cir., 1974).
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 44, at 630.
Id.
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More recently, the Supreme Court has enunciated yet a fifth test to
determine whether Congress intended to abrogate treaty rights. The latest
case dealing with abrogation of Indian treaty rights is United States v
Dion.72 In Dion, the Supreme Court retreated from the White test of
express legislative reference and formulated a test
that has become known
' '
as the "actual consideration and choice test" - 1
What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually
considered the conflict between its intended action on the one
hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve
that conflict by abrogating the treaty 74
In Dion, a member of the Yankton Sioux tribe was prosecuted under
the Bald Eagle Protection Act 75 and the Endangered Species Act for
shooting bald and golden eagles." The Supreme Court found sufficient
circumstantial evidence that Congress intended to abrogate Indian hunting rights when it passed the Bald Eagle Protection Act.77 That intent was
evidenced by the fact that Congress established a permit system under
which Indians could take bald eagles for religious purposes.7 8 Although the
Court held that no treaty right prevented the defendant from being
prosecuted under the Endangered Species Act, the Court expressly
declined to decide whether the Endangered Species Act also abrogated
treaty rights.7 9
Beginning with Lone Wolfv Hitchcock in 1903 and extending to Dion
v UnitedStatesin 1986, the Supreme Court has often found that Congress
abrogated Indian treaty rights using one test or another. The Florida state
court case of State v Billie8" continues that long line of cases dealing with
abrogation but with a substantial distinction. Not only did the court look
for and find express Congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty hunting
rights in the Endangered Species Act, l it extended, to the states, the power
to substantially infringe upon Indian reservation hunting rights in the
interest of conservation. 2 The federal district court case of UnitedStates v
Billie which involved the same defendant, also extended the line of
abrogation cases. The federal district court disposed of the question that
72. 476 U.S. 734.
73.

Laurence, supra note 1, at 12.

74. 476 U.S. 740.
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668(d) (1988).
76. 476 U.S. at 735.
77. Id. at 743.
78.

16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668(d) (1988).

79. 476 U.S. at 745.
80. 497 So. 2d at 892.
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1982).

82. State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 894.
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the Supreme Court in Dion had left unanswered: the Endangered Species
Act does abrogate Indian reservation hunting rights.8"
REASONING

The Florida district court conceded that the Big Cypress Indian
Reservation carried with it traditional Indian hunting rights for the
Seminole Indians.8 4 Reservations created by executive order, like the Big
Cypress Reservation, carry the same hunting rights as reservations created
by treaties.8 5 Once the Florida district court determined that Billie had a
treaty right to hunt the Florida panther, the Florida district court turned to
whether Florida's statute, which prohibited the killing of panthers, could
supersede that hunting right.8 "
Florida obtained jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or
against the Seminole Indians through Public Law 280.87 Section Seven 8 of
this act granted states the right to acquire criminal jurisdiction over
Indians by legislative enactment. 89 State law affecting tribal members is
generally inapplicable within Indian reservations. However, states may
obtain jurisdiction over tribes when Congress expressly permits it.9" Public
Law 280 was enacted in 1953 to mandate that six states assume civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands and to give all other states the
option to assume similar jurisdiction. 9' Public Law 280 was passed during
the Termination Era, a time when the national policy was to terminate the
trust relationship between the tribes and the federal government. 92 That
policy has since been replaced by the policy of self-determination. 3
Public Law 280 exempts tribes from either state civil or criminal
jurisdiction over hunting, trapping, or fishing rights protected by treaty or

83. 667 F Supp. at 1492.
84. 497 So. 2d at 891.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 892.
87. Public Law 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988))
88. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title 4, § 403, 82 Stat. 79 (1968).
89. Billie at 891. Public Law 280 was amended in 1968 to require tribal consent to subsequent
extension of state jurisdiction under Public Law 280 but the cession of jurisdiction to Florida was not
affected. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
90. Richard Monette, Indian Country Jurisdictionand the Assimilative Crimes Act, 69 Or. L.
Rev. 269, 270 (1990).
91. Public Law 280 extended state criminal and civil jurisdiction over all Indian lands in
California and Nebraska, most Indian land in Minnesota, Oregon, Wisconsin, and eventually all
Indian land in Alaska. Several states, including Montana, have since assumed a measure of Public Law
280 jurisdiction. See Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts:Influencing
The Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 Mont. L. Rev. 211, 232 (1991).
92. Id. at 276.
93. Id.
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statute.94 However, in situations that do not involve protected treaty rights,
a state that has acquired jurisdiction under Public Law 280, can enforce
state law against Indian hunting on the reservation if the state law is
criminal prohibitory rather than regulatory "IThe statute could be applied
to Billie under Public Law 280 because the Florida court determined that
the Endangered Species Act had abrogated Billie's right to hunt the
panther and because the Florida statute prohibiting the killing of panthers
was a criminal prohibitory, rather than civil regulatory statute. 96 Further,
the Florida court drew from the Supreme Court decisions in the Puyallup
cases to pronounce that states could regulate Indians' rights to hunt if there
was a need to conserve a species without having to rely on either the
97
Endangered Species Act or Public Law 280.
Additionally, Billie contended that federal law pre-empted the field of
endangered species through the Endangered Species Act.98 The Florida
district court flatly disagreed with that contention.9 9 The Endangered
Species Act was passed in 1973 and hailed as the "most comprehensive
legislation ever enacted by any nation."1 00 The purpose behind the Act was
to stop and reverse the increasing trend toward species' extinction, no
matter the cost.101 The Florida court pointed to Section 1535(f) of the
Endangered Species Act where Congress expressly said that the Act was
not to be construed to void any state law which was intended to preserve fish
or wildlife.'0 2 The Florida district court continued that only when state law
directly conflicted with federal law, by allowing actions prohibited by the
federal law or restricting actions allowed by the federal law, did the federal
law pre-empt the state law in the field of endangered species protection. 0 3
Consequently, the Florida district court held that the state of Florida had
the power to prohibit the killing of Florida panthers on tribal lands, and to
04
prosecute Billie under that state statute.1
The extension, to the states, of the power to abrogate Indian treaty
rights departs from Dion. In Dion, the Supreme Court allowed Congress to
abrogate Indian treaty rights, something courts had done since Lone Wolf

94.
95.
96.
97.
Puyallup
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 285.
Id. at 277.
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 892.
Id. at 892. See Washington Game Dep'tv. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44,49(1973); See also
Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165, 175 (1977).
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 893.
Id.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1492.
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 894.
Id.
Id.
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v Hitchcock.1 0 5 With State v Billie, however, the Florida district court
extended Dion by holding that because the Endangered Species Act
abrogated Indian hunting rights, states with criminal prohibitory jurisdiction under Public Law 280 had the ability to supersede Indian reservation
hunting rights and that states could abrogate Indian hunting rights if there
was a need to conserve a species.' 06
In Dion, the Supreme Court held that the Bald Eagle Protection Act
abrogated Indian treaty hunting rights. The Florida court, following the
Supreme Court's lead in Dion, found that the Endangered Species Act
abrogated Indian treaty hunting rights.' The Florida district court's
reliance on Dion to support its holding that the Endangered Species Act
abrogated Indian treaty rights is not well-reasoned. In Dton the court
found express legislative intent in the Eagle Protection Act to abrogate
treaty rights. 0 8 Legislators directly discussed the hunting of eagles by
Indians, indicating actual consideration of the impact of the proposed
legislation on Indians. 0 9 Congress then took measures to mitigate those
effects by adopting a permit system which allowed Indians to take eagles
for religious purposes."' Congress considered the conflict between the Act
and Indian treaty rights and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty "I
Express legislative intent was not as clear in State v Billie. The
Florida district court, in a sweeping statement with little analysis, found
that the Endangered Species Act abrogated inherent hunting rights of the
Seminole Indians because the Act exempted Alaskan natives." 2 The
Florida court reasoned that because Congress only exempted Alaskan
natives from the Act,"' Congress did not intend to exempt anyone else,
including the Seminole Indians." 4 The Florida court presumed that
Congress' reference to Alaskan natives indicated that Congress had in fact
taken into consideration all Indians and decided to only exempt Alaskan
Natives." 5 This is an incorrect presumption. Alaskan natives divide into

105. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 554.
106. State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 892. See also Washington Game Dep't v. Puyallup Tribe, 414
U.S. 44 (1973).
107. State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 894.
108. 476 U.S. at 743.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 744.
111. Id.
112. State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 894.
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 17.5 (1991).
114. State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 894.
115. Robert J. Miller, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon and the
Endangered Species Act, 70 OR. L. Rav 543, 568 (1991).
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three ethnic groups-Eskimo, Aleuts, and Indians. 116 Congress has routinely passed special legislation directed at Alaskan natives. To presume
that Congress considered all Indian hunting treaty rights when it exempted
Alaskan natives does not meet the express legislative intent test required by
Dion." 7

The Florida district court also relied on the Act's general comprehensiveness to find that it abrogated Billie's hunting rights.'" This also is an
incorrect reading of Dion." 9 The actual consideration and choice test set
out in Dion requires express legislative intent to abrogate treaty rights, not
20
just the comprehensiveness of a statute.
The reasoning in the federal Billie decision was similarly flawed. The
federal court misapplied the Dion test requiring express legislative intent
to abrogate Indian treaty rights. Instead of looking for express legislative
intent to abrogate the treaty, the federal court focused, as the Florida court
did, on the comprehensiveness of the Endangered Species Act, the Alaskan
native exception, and the arguable inclusion of Indians within the definition of "person."'' The federal court "discarded the Dion test in favor of a
more liberal test built upon a series of inferences.' 22 The federal court also
relied on legislative history of other acts similar to the ESA that were not
passed to find Congressional intent to abrogate. 123 In essence the federal
court "spoke for Congress" and "judicially created legislative history for
'2 4
the ESA.'
The impact of the Billie decisions on future law could be enormous.
Though Dion sets out a rather stringent test for determining when
abrogation of a treaty right can occur, the Billie decisions indicate how
state and federal courts may interpret that test. When dealing with broad
legislative statutes such as the Bald Eagle Protection Act or the Endangered Species Act, Dion called for "clear evidence that Congress actually
considered the conflict between its intended action on one hand and Indian
treaty rights on the other and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 894.

119. Laurence, supra note 1, at 18.
120. Id.
121. United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1491.
122. Miller, supra note 115, at 569.
123. An Interior Department official, at a House Subcommittee hearing on the Predatory
Mammals and Endangered Species: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 144 (1972),
testified that "to eliminate Indian treaty rights, it should do so 'expressly.' This legislation was never
passed and to use it as evidence of express legislative intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights is
inaccurate. See Miller, supra note 115, at 570.
124. Miller, supra note 115, at 570.
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the treaty 1215 The courts in the Billie decisions sidestepped this test and
relied instead on the general comprehensiveness of the Endangered Species
Act and a "negative inference that the nonexclusion of Indians under the
ESA clearly indicated an intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights."12 6
In addition, the Florida district court in State v Billie also gave states
with criminal prohibitory statutes under Public Law 280 the right to
supersede treaty rights in the interest of conserving a species. 2 7 Also, the
federal court in United States v Billie created legislative history for the
ESA in order to find express intent to abrogate."2 8 The effect is to abrogate
Indian treaty rights without meeting the stringent Dion test.
CONCLUSION

State v Billie and United States v Billie go far beyond the decision in
Dion. Both misuse the "express intent" test to find treaty abrogation and
effectively extend abrogation rights to states in the interest of conservation
and to Congress when it enacts comprehensive legislation that does not
contain express intent. This, however, is not the real significance of the
Billie decisions. These decisions signify that the Florida Panther and other
endangered species are still not receiving the protection they require. The
luxury no longer exists to continue to divide this issue into an Indian/nonIndian issue. The Florida panther is disappearing and it no longer matters
who is to blame. In order to save the panther, Indians and non-Indians need
to cooperate to save this majestic creature from extinction.

125.
126.
127.
128.

476 U.S. at 740.
Miller, supra note 115, at 570.
State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 891.
U.S. v. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1490.

